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n the latter half of the 1980s, the Chinese Central Military Commission (CMC) bolstered the countryÕs strategic deterrent by adding conventionally armed missiles to its strike forces. At first, the missiles were viewed as part of a menu of weapons for foreign arms sales, though little thought appears to have been given to their eventual role in the order of battle for the PeopleÕs Liberation Army (PLA). 1 Starting in 1993, ChinaÕs military strategy was transformed as the conventional missile arsenal grew. US capabilities demonstrated in the Gulf War, as well as the increased threat of Taiwan declaring independence from the mainland, created a more sophisticated approach to the concept of nuclear deterrence, the combined use of conventional and nuclear missiles, and preparations for a cross-strait war with Taiwan and the United States. In the decades that followed, these seemingly separate changes came together and led to the formulation of a war plan that presents both the Chinese and potential military adversaries with daunting uncertainties.
The basic dilemma stems from the deployment of both nuclear and conventional missiles on bases controlled by the Second Artillery, which previously had been solely tasked with overseeing the countryÕs nuclear deterrent, and the close links those bases have to the theater military commands.
If, in a time of high tension, the Chinese command authorized a conventional missile attack as an act of preemptive self-defense, the enemy and its allies could not know if the incoming missiles were conventional or nuclear. In a worstcase scenario, a Chinese first-strike conventional attack could spark retaliation that destroys Chinese nuclear assets, creating a situation in which escalation to full-scale nuclear war would not just be possible, but even likely.
China's conceptual approach to nuclear weapons A basic understanding of the Chinese approach to nuclear weapons includes the knowledge of BeijingÕs military strategy or basic military strategic guideline (junshi zhanlu ¬e fangzhen ), nuclear policy (he zhengce ), nuclear strategy (he zhanlu ¬e ), nuclear deterrence theory (he weishe lilun ), applied strategic principles (zhanlu ¬e yunyong yuanze ), and operational regulations (zuozhan tiaoling ). These conceptual elements form a sixtier hierarchy and define the theoretical basis of ChinaÕs buildup of nuclear forces and nuclear war plan. In theory, they determine how ChinaÕs nuclear forces are deployed and employed for combat.
Yet, what began as the pursuit of a ÒpureÓ nuclear war plan could not resist the influence of changes that gained momentum in the 1980s and continue to the present day. The authoritative ChinaÕs National Defense in 2006 puts it this way: ÒPursuing a selfdefensive nuclear strategy, ChinaÕs nuclear strategy is subject to the stateÕs nuclear policy and military strategyÓ (State Council of the PeopleÕs Republic of China, 2006: Sect. II). Nuclear strategy itself, now being tested in repeated military exercises, has adjusted to the introduction of conventional missiles into the Second Artillery, the emergence and management of the ever-present threat of Taiwan ÒseparatismÓ as the central military priority, and the development of an overall war plan that integrates nuclear and conventional weapons and Second Artillery command structures into the theater military commands.
The starting point for the PLAÕs military strategy is Òactive defenseÓ (Lewis and Xue, 2011a,b) , a principle that aims to Ògain mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck firstÓ (hou fa zhi ren ) (Peng et al., 1989: 169) . That principle finds direct expression in the countryÕs fundamental nuclear policy, now approaching its 50th anniversary.
From its first nuclear test in 1964, China has not substantially changed its declared nuclear policy (Yao, 2007) . Specifically, over most of the past decades, that policy has included these essential components (Jia and Dong, 1999: 410"415; Feng, 1993 Feng, : 1311 Ma, 2007: 101"105):
. Nuclear weapons should be completely prohibited and thoroughly destroyed worldwide. . The threats presented by the nuclear powers have compelled China to develop nuclear weapons; its small arsenal is only for selfdefense. . At no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons, an obvious derivative of a no-first-use policy, or hou fa zhi ren. . China will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapon states or in nuclear weapon-free zones. . China opposes nuclear proliferation, will never help other countries develop nuclear weapons, and will not deploy nuclear weapons in other countries.
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. Since the 1980s, China has demanded that countries importing nuclear-related materials and equipment from China accept the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and not retransfer them to a third country without ChinaÕs consent. China has also guaranteed that all imported nuclear materials and equipment would be used only for peaceful purposes. 3 Even a cursory examination of these components leads to a conclusion that is obvious but needs to be noted: ChinaÕs nuclear policy is controlled by national political concerns and decisions. BeijingÕs leaders have traditionally deemed nuclear weapons to be political instruments with a deterrent role that now is considered central (Peng et al., 1989) . Their position results in a wellrecognized aspect of ChinaÕs international arms control statements that often mention and explain its nuclear policy but not its nuclear strategy, which is dominated by military considerations. Simply put, nuclear policy is open and widely promulgated, while nuclear strategy is sensitive and rarely elaborated in public.
Nuclear strategy contains decisions relevant to weapons procurements, deployment, and employment, and to civil defense (Wu and Wu, 2007) . Chinese officials call these decisions the ÒcontentÓ (neirong ) or Òelem-entsÓ (yaosu ) of nuclear strategy (Ma, 2007; Yao, 2007) . Nuclear strategy covers the requirements for deterrence and the principal national security and combat missions of ChinaÕs nuclear forces, as well as the organization of those forces, plans for nuclear war preparedness, and regulations for nuclear alerts and targeting under wartime conditions (Ma et al., 1992; Li and Teng, 2007) . Chinese military experts have compared their nuclear-related conceptual elements as a whole to the US nuclear war plan, or Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), as it was called until 2003. 4 After the formal establishment of the Second Artillery on July 1, 1966, those responsible for the initial buildup of the nuclear forcesÑfrom Mao Zedong to Marshal Nie RongzhenÑprovided guidance on nuclear policy, not nuclear strategy, and no leaders since then have ever expressed any interest, let alone crafted a Ònuclear doctrineÓ (he xueshuo ). 5 In terms of the building and employment of nuclear weapons, they merely limited the scale of ChinaÕs nuclear arsenal to Òminimum retaliation meansÓ (qima de huanji shouduan ), providing almost no other details 6 (Nie, 1986 The main task for these officers was to formulate the Second ArtilleryÕs Òsci-ence of operationsÓ (zhanyi xue ) and operational principles and rules for missile launch units. The Second Artillery assigned Major General Li Lijing, then deputy director of the Committee for Academic Research, to oversee the studies on the science of operations. Almost immediately, however, Li Lijing recognized the flaw in his assignmentÑthe absence of a formal integrated nuclear strategyÑand reported it to the Second Artillery, which authorized him to establish a nuclear strategy research team to draft a comprehensive nuclear strategy.
From March to November 1987, a series of symposia on Òacademic issues regarding [military] strategy and nuclear strategyÓ were held in Beijing (Shen, 2008: 142) . Some 50 to 60 experts from ChinaÕs Academy of Military Science, the National Defense University, the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense, the Ministry of State Security, and the Second Artillery attended to draft the nationÕs nuclear strategy. It took two more years before the CMC formally endorsed the final version of the strategy.
The draft represented a meaningful break from the past and provided the basis for advancing the current Òlimited nuclear retaliationÓ (youxian he baofu ) strategy, which replaced the term Òminimum retaliationÓ (Zhang, 1994: 119 
China and nuclear deterrence theory
Before the development of a nuclear strategy, the Central Military Commission repudiated the ideas behind deterrence and linked it with Òimperialist blackmail.Ó Such rejection was repeatedly echoed in Chinese official statements. For example, ChinaÕs first white paper on arms control and nonproliferation issued in 1995 stated, ÒThe Chinese Government has always opposed nuclear blackmail and nuclear deterrence policyÓ (Teng, 2011: 26) .
Such public statements did not reflect reality. Although MaoÕs immediate successors could not safely embrace the concept of nuclear deterrence, no enemy, they held, could ignore the existence of ChinaÕs nuclear weapons arsenal, and current military analysts now claim that China in fact had adopted an Òexistential nuclear deterrenceÓ (cunzaixing he weishe ) theory under Mao himself (Zhao, 2009: 397) . The very existence of the Chinese arsenal had forced BeijingÕs enemies to think twice before launching a nuclear assault. Furthermore, the history of the 1969 Sino-Soviet nuclear confrontation demonstrated that ChinaÕs Òminimum retaliation meansÓ in fact did function to deter Moscow from launching a surgical attack against China, and Mao knew it. 9 Nevertheless, for most of the Deng Xiaoping era, from 1977 to 1997, the military spoke only of the limited nuclear retaliation as dictated by the no-first-use policy and the Second ArtilleryÕs ÒlimitedÓ nuclear arsenal.
The commitment to the no-first-use policy, of course, reflected the reality of ChinaÕs small and highly vulnerable nuclear arsenal. One source puts it this way: ÒThe small number of [our countryÕs] nuclear missiles cannot destroy an enemy stateÕs nuclear counterattack forces. The launch of nuclear assaults would no doubt provoke unbearable nuclear retaliation. Judging from this logic, the assumption that China would launch nuclear assaults [first] is absolutely incredibleÓ (Research Society, 2011) . A decision to launch first would have been tantamount to suicide. In the polemics with Moscow and Washington in the 1960s and thereafter, Òno-first-use,Ó of course, had a better ring to it than Òavoiding self-destruction.Ó By the latter half of the 1990s, however, Chinese officials and security specialists used the ever-increasing academic exchanges with Western counterparts to distance themselves from MaoÕs dicta and to incorporate deterrence into their strategic lexicon (Research Society, 2011; Teng, 2011) . Moreover, their nuclear arsenal was no longer so limited and vulnerable, and the arsenal was growing within a new, less threatening strategic security environment. The time had come to add nuclear deterrence to the search for a modern nuclear strategy. 10 It was not until 2006, however, that ChinaÕs defense white paper did finally connect deterrence to the nationÕs nuclear forces and officially endorse the terms nuclear deterrent force (he weishe liliang ) and strategic deterrence (zhanlu ¬e weishe ). It declared, ÒThe Second Artillery Force aims at progressively improving its force structure of having both nuclear and conventional missiles, and raising its capabilities in strategic deterrence and conventional strike under conditions of informatization. . . . Its fundamental goal is to deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China. . . . It endeavors to ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons and maintains a credible nuclear deterrent forceÓ (State Council of the PeopleÕs Republic of China, 2006: Sect. II). Nuclear deterrence had come of age in China.
Under the CMC leadership of Jiang Zemin, from 1989 to 2004, and Hu Lewis and Xue 49 Jintao, from 2004 to 2012, the Chinese military added new content to the theory, though its essence remained unchanged. In the Jiang Zemin years, the theory was routinely described as Òcombining multiple means,Ó including nuclear and conventional ones (he chang jianbei duozhong shouduan peihe Ò Ó), to strengthen the deterrent. Jiang highlighted the relationship between the Òconventional swordÓ and the Ònuclear shieldÓ as ChinaÕs unique dual deterrent.
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In 2006, Hu Jintao authorized further changes that reflected the growing influence of Sun Zi in the military, advocating a self-defensive nuclear strategy in order to Òsubdue the enemy without fighting a battleÓ (buzhan er qu ren zhi bing ). Thereafter, Hu urged the Second Artillery to build a streamlined and effective strategic force for nuclear deterrence and conventional strikes (jinggan youxiao he chang jianbei de zhanlu ¬e daji liliang ) if needed, but primarily for self-defense and war prevention.
Strategic guidelines evolve
Coinciding with the official adoption of nuclear deterrence and its increasing sophistication, the basic military strategic guideline simultaneously began to change. After his return to power in 1977, Deng Xiaoping reexamined the security threat to China. As Sino-US relations improved in the 1980s, the Soviet threat also began to ebb, and DengÕs first conclusions were that war would be neither global nor imminent. The United States remained mired in a global stalemate with the Soviet Union, and American power had met its match in Vietnam. At the same time, he could foresee ChinaÕs own coming clash with Vietnam and, perhaps, with India at some far distant point. In 1984, based on DengÕs strategic calculus, the CMC began to embrace a new strategic guideline of preparing for local wars and limited conflicts (youxian chongtu ) and even considered abandoning the still-hallowed Maoist guideline of preparing for Òan early war, an allout war, and a nuclear warÓ (Wang, 1999: 276) . DengÕs guideline prompted the military to start research and development on sophisticated conventional weapons for limited local conflicts. Faced with an inferior and difficult-tomodernize air force and navy, the CMC would rely on the Second Artillery for a quick fix with the introduction of conventional missiles (Ge, 2008) .
As demonstrated in ChinaÕs short but disastrous war with Vietnam in 1979, Beijing concluded that the PLA could not fight as an integrated force in a local war, and, in 1987, its security theorists stepped up research on joint operations (lianhe zhanyi ) using advanced technologies.
12 By 1988, it had become clear that a new military strategic guideline was needed to prepare for a possible future war. No longer fearful of foregoing MaoÕs legacy, the commission formally decided to switch the strategic guideline to preparing for local wars and Òsudden incidentsÓ (tufa shijian ) (Ge, 2008: 295) . But this was only the beginning. In its decisive victory in the 1991 Gulf War, the United States carried out a so-called Òrevolution in military affairsÓ by integrating modern information and communications systems, intelligence capabilities, space technology, futuristic aircraft, and advanced tactics. Within a short period, moreover, Beijing reacted to Taiwanese President Lee Teng-huiÕs alleged attempt to move Taipei away from the one-China policy.
In November 1992, CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin authorized General Zhang Zhen, JiangÕs deputy within the CMC, to conduct research on the feasibility of adopting a new guideline to adapt to the Òswift development of the international situationÓ and the global military revolution (Ling, 2005: 18"20) . In January 1993, Jiang told his generals to adopt a guideline of winning Òhigh-tech local warsÓ focused on ChinaÕs southeast coast, that is, the Taiwan Strait (Jiang, 2006a: Vol. 1, 285) . The elements of a new military strategic guideline were being put in place.
This guideline redefined the central military mission of the PeopleÕs Liberation Army, identified ChinaÕs Òimagined enemies,Ó and set the scale and type of future operations. Fighting a high-tech local war was listed for the first time as the PLAÕs priority mission, and the new guideline formally helped cast off the historic burden of preparing for a land invasion (Peng, 2002) . The next imagined enemies were Taiwan separatists and their nuclear-armed US supporters, though BeijingÕs overall national strategy still gave priority to peace, stability, and development while preparing for the predicted high-tech local war.
The Chinese military has continued to add new elements to the military strategic guideline. In 1999, the CMC revised it to winning local wars under conditions of informatization and nuclear deterrence, and on December 27, 2002, Jiang, a former minister of electronics, put ever-greater emphasis on the relevance of the information era and deleted any reference to nuclear deterrence. His new guideline would Òswitch . . . from preparation for local wars under general conditions to the winning of local wars under conditions of informatizationÓ (Jiang, 2006b: Vol. 3, 584) . By this time, the need to deter a US nuclear response had become far less pressing, though nuclear deterrence still remained viable. And these changes continued under Hu Jintao, who in March 2004 promoted the concept of scientific development for ChinaÕs long-term growth, including the military.
Conventional missile programs
As early as 1984, the Ministry of Astronautics Industry assigned the First Academy (for building missile launch vehicles) to develop a conventional tactical missile primarily for sales abroad. In October 1985, the academy started work on the missileÕs overall design. The ministry code-named the missile M-9, but internally called it the DF-15. This single-stage missile had a 600-kilometer range and could be fitted for either a conventional or a nuclear warhead. Stored in semi-hardened launch sites, its mobility and solid rocket propulsion would help solve the increasing vulnerability of the missile forces to detection and destruction.
three countries that had begun introducing advanced conventional weapons into their order of battle. The contention for control of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea further added to the perceived threat. The PLA had neither aircraft carriers nor in-flight refueling capability and could not dominate the air over the Spratlys should war break out. As a makeshift measure, the CMC turned to another of its missiles under development, the medium-range DF-25.
The CMC then had to decide where to put these new short-to-medium-range missilesÑeither the regular armed forces or the Second ArtilleryÑand a strong debate erupted. These missiles were to supplement the short-range tactical missiles long stationed in select ground forces units. As a Second Artillery deputy commander recalled, the case for the missiles to go to the Second Artillery was overwhelming. Only the strategic rocket forces had the proven leadership, management, and logistical systems needed for fully and quickly constructing and running the conventional missile launch sites and support facilities. Despite the obvious rejoinderÑonly the regular ground, naval, and air force units were tasked to fight a conventional war, and they already possessed older tactical missilesÑthe CMC accepted the Second ArtilleryÕs arguments because of the advantages of its Òlow investment and quick work resultsÓ (Ge, 2008: 295) .
The Second Artillery accelerated the preparations for forming a unit under Base 52, the main missile complex opposite Taiwan, and the base received its first DF-15s in April 1992. One year later, as the missiles were still arriving, the CMC formally commissioned the first conventional missile brigade and ordered it to be ready to launch within one year (Ge, 2008; Modernization, 2009) .
Since the mid-1990s, the number of Base 52Õs conventional brigades and new, more accurate ballistic missiles has steadily increased, even as the political changes on Taiwan clearly reduced the so-called separatist threat, and these quick-action Òfist unitsÓ (quantou budui ) have proliferated throughout the coastal areas opposite Taiwan (Ge, 2008; Modernization, 2009 The merger of missile forces into the general war plan
As short-and medium-range conventional missiles were being deployed, ChinaÕs prevailing doctrine on combined-arms operations allowed only the integration of the combat capabilities of various units within a single service; the ground forces played the decisive role with the backing of other services (that is, the navy, air force, and Second Artillery). Truly joint operations, by contrast, would combine the capabilities of several services and prioritize them according to perceived combat requirements. The Second Artillery commanders would now have direct battlefield responsibilities for the first time. But making this adjustment would take time, and even now the rules of engagement are still being rewritten and repeatedly tested in exercises in the effort to prove fully joint war-fighting capabilities. As joint operations are now envisaged, the Chinese ground forces no longer automatically enjoy the dominant position; the three services and the conventional missile forces have equal status in the commandand-control chain (Fan, 1998) .
It should be noted that, at first, the CMC deemed conventional missiles only as a range-extending weapons system. Its senior officers, however, soon maintained that a Òhuge psychological impact on the enemyÓ would result from a conventional missile assault and that the threat of that attack could Òdeter the outbreak of a conventional local war in time of peace and contain the expansion and escalation of a conventional local war after it had broken outÓ (Wang, 1989: 298) . Now the Second Artillery could act both during crises and local wars.
At the same time, BeijingÕs leaders worked to keep the Second ArtilleryÕs conceptual world in line with changes in the military strategic guideline. The CMC labored to place the PLA command-and-control mechanisms and training programs on a ÒscientificÓ basis, which first seemed more like a slogan than a genuine improvement on JiangÕs demand for ever greater dependence on information technology. On June 27, 2006, Hu elaborated on the concept of ÒsystemsÓ (tixi ) by using information technologies to integrate all of the PLA services and their systemsÑor what the Chinese call the Òsys-tem of systems.Ó Hu said: ÒA local war under conditions of informatization is a confrontation among systems, and its basic form is the integrated joint operations. Joint operations need joint training. We must attach importance to the enhancement of integrated joint combat capabilities and place stress on joint trainingÓ . In March 2012, Hu then urged the PLA to take the Òsys-temsÓ to a new level by strengthening capabilities for Òsystems confrontationÓ (tixi duikang ) with potential enemies (Wang and Cao, 2012: 1) .
More and more training would concentrate on winning the information-technology battle under combat conditions. For the Second Artillery, HuÕs Òsystems confrontationÓ would require streamlining command and control for deterrence, crisis management, and war-fighting. (Ge, 2008: 300; Yuan, 2009: 294) . While some considered the three ÒdoublesÓ no more than slogans, the efforts to test and refine these concepts in multiple and increasingly realistic exercises suggest otherwise. Both Òsys-tems confrontationÓ and the three ÒdoublesÓ now play a key role in the search for a complete strategy that supports the most recent military strategic guidelines and deterrence theory.
For the CMC, systems coordination required a focus on senior personnel assignments in support of intelligence sharing, interoperable combat communications, and transparent Lewis and Xue 53 command-and-control mechanisms. Coordinating the conventional missile forces and the other PLA services in theater joint operations posed a myriad of novel and complex challenges. To meet them, the General Staff designated groups at three levels. In the first one, the Second Artillery dispatches a Òcoordinating groupÓ (xietiao zu ) to join similar groups from the other services at the theater joint operations headquarters. These groups participate in formulating the procedures for the general war plan, and together they coordinate the conventional missile brigades with the combat units of the other services. When authorized by the theater commander, the Second Artillery group then issues orders to the missile brigades, supervises their implementation, and helps update the joint operations.
At the second level, a designated missile base and the theater headquarters of other relevant services exchange Òcoordinating and liaison groupsÓ (xietiao lianluo zu ). Each group reports to its own headquarters on orders assigned from its counterpart services, provides feedback on the requirements for actions to be taken by other services, and submits requests for actions to be taken by the other services on behalf of its own headquarters.
Finally, in theater joint operations, each missile base must strengthen coordination among its engaged missile brigades and the combat units of other relevant services. To do this, it must set up a Òtheater coordinating teamÓ (zhanchang xietiao xiaozu ) responsible for such actions as reporting launch positions and maneuver routes of missile battalions, warning on the timing and trajectories of missiles to be launched, and submitting requirements for support. Missile brigades can also dispatch battlefield teams to the combat units of other services as ad hoc assignments (Zhou, 2002) .
According to the war plan, the conventional missile forces, in contrast to other major military units, mostly play a supplementary role in theater joint operations. But they have the principal role in striking against the enemyÕs targets in strategic depthÑincluding airfields, naval ports, missile launch bases, and command-and-control centers. Moreover, the worsening crossstrait relations in the 1990s opened the way for the conventional missile forces to play a part in emerging crises. The increased threat of TaiwanÕs independence had already accelerated the growth of the conventional missile arsenal and brought changes to the military strategic guideline and the theory of deterrence. These missiles could now be used in a limited Òfirst strikeÓÑthat is, a justifiable self-defensive first use of missiles launched from a once all-nuclear baseÑfor war-initiation or presumed crisis-control purposes.
In July 1995 and March 1996, conventional missiles from Base 52 were targeted against the waters close to Taiwan as a warning to TaipeiÕs independence-minded leaders. How much their use aggravated rather than moderated the crisis is still open to dispute. 14 Yet, for Beijing, the missiles had hit their intended political targets: Taiwanese public opinion and US defense policy. As one Chinese source states: ÒOn the day after the launches of six missiles [in July 1995], over 6,000 Taiwanese Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68 (5) people held a demonstration against the independence forces. The stock market in Taiwan twice crashed right after the missile launchesÓ (Li et al., 2000: 56) . Despite the strong US military response, which had now been exposed for the CMCÕs future planning purposes, Beijing had found a useful tool for Òmaintaining pressureÓ (baochi yali ) on TaiwanÕs separatists to Òreadjust their strategy for independenceÓ (Zhu, 2000: 166) . For their part, the Second Artillery commanders have continued to argue that the missiles launched in the mid-1990s Òdid contain the ÔTaiwan independenceÕ forcesÕ arroganceÓ (Jing and Peng, 2008: 8) .
Applied strategic principles
In the six-tier hierarchy that defines the role for ChinaÕs nuclear weapons within the overall war plan, applied strategic principles and operation regulations directly govern the Second ArtilleryÕs training, exercises, and, in wartime, combat operations. The applied strategic principles summarize the main conceptual elements within the first four tiers of the six-tier strategic hierarchy and as action statements dictate the formulation and execution of operational regulations. They are also called Òapplied operational principlesÓ (zuozhan yunyong yuanze ) and have separate versions for nuclear and conventional missile units.
In pursuit of the so-called core nuclear strategy of Òdeterrence of a nuclear war and limited nuclear retaliation,Ó five applied principles govern the nuclear force. These are consistent with the conceptual elements of the first four tiers and, while repetitious, are more detailed. They are (Li, 2008: 29"31; Second ArtilleryÕs, 2006) :
. Oppose nuclear blackmail (fan heÕezha ): Deter the enemy from starting a nuclear war, and thwart and neutralize the enemyÕs nuclear deterrent and blackmail. . Gain mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck first (hou fa zhi ren ): At no time be the first to use nuclear weapons, and, if the enemy strikes, authorize only limited nuclear retaliation. . Centralize command (jizhong zhihui ): The CMC alone has the power to decide on and direct the employment of nuclear missiles. The Second Artillery must carry out the CMCÕs orders strictly and correctly. . Strictly protect the missile units (yanmi fanghu ): Ensure the survivability of the missiles needed for the counterattack. . Strike only key targets (zhongdian fanji ): Choose only strategic targets in the enemyÕs homeland for effective nuclear retaliation.
While nuclear weapons have predominantly political and war-prevention or deterrence uses, conventional missiles, as we have seen, are deemed premier weapons for preemptive strikes in a high-tech local war. The CMC thus has adopted eight more-detailed applied operational principles for those missile units:
. 
Operational regulations for nuclear weapons
The sixth and final tier in the control and use of Chinese nuclear weapons, operational regulations, governs the combat actions of the missile units and the use of their nuclear weapons. 15 Many of their contents also apply to the actions of the conventional missile brigades.
Compared with those of the other services, the Second ArtilleryÕs commandand-control procedures for the nuclear units are more explicit and inflexible. These procedures apply to both the nuclear and conventional missile forces in accordance with the Òsystem of systemsÓ and Òthree doublesÓ requirements. The need for absolute control over these missile forces has given ever-higher urgency to improving and validating the Second ArtilleryÕs wartime practices, and the unique relationship of the Second Artillery to the CMC has made the rocket forcesÕ modernization both easier and more sensitive than similar efforts in the other services. But beyond modernization and readiness is the ultimate challenge of the nuclear nightmare, the final dimensions of which can never be fully known or adequately anticipated.
For Beijing and the still-haunting legacy of Mao Zedong, who repeatedly called on his troops to Òget organized,Ó institutionalized procedures are bedrock. Under the all-powerful CMC, the General Staff Operations Department plays a critical role in the communications chain from the commission to the missile headquarters. The CMC uses this departmentÕs command center to transmit and monitor all missile deployment and employment decisions. For their part, the missile bases have constructed command centers in hardened underground bunkers that contain communications equipment, drainage and decontamination systems, and power generators. Commanders in these centers reportedly believe they could survive and operate for long periods under nuclear, conventional, cyber, or chemical attacks. The Second Artillery also has created redundant mobile airborne and truck-mounted posts to communicate with launch battalions. By 1998, the General Staff Communications Department had developed a Òsoftware radio technologyÓ to connect the transceivers using different frequencies. This technology, PLA sources state, integrated analogue and digital messages. It ensured reliability and protected Òsystem of systemsÓ communications between the Second Artillery headquarters and the CMCÕs four general departments (staff, political, logistics, and armaments) and between the missile bases and the other PLA services in joint operations. Earlier, the communications department also began working on a blast-and jamproof underground communications system capable of penetrating hundreds of meters of hard rock. By the late 1990s, this state-of-the-art equipment in the command centers could link the CMC and the strategic missile bases under the most complex wartime conditions. Short of its total destruction, the engineers held, the center could provide Òcommunications of last resort.Ó The department then added more secure Ònuclear counterattack communicationsÓ equipment to these centers, and a recent authoritative PLA source states that these communications guarantee the CMCÕs wartime command and control over all nuclear forces .
Even as it has upgraded its missiles and these command-and-control mechanisms and tested their readiness, the missile command prescribed a fourstage alert system and a two-level order sequence for the launch of nuclear weapons. From the lowest to highest, the four-stage system consists of Standing War Preparedness Alert, Class 3 Alert, Class 2 Alert, and Class 1 Alert.
The CMC authorized a two-level sequence of orders to raise the alert status and, in extremis, to launch nuclear weapons: the preparatory order (yuxian haoling ) and the formal order (zhengshi mingling ). A preparatory order normally contains four main parts: a concise description of the enemyÕs status; a brief statement of the unitÕs assigned mission; the unitÕs required preparations with a precise schedule; and the timing and location of the operation. The CMC gives this order to initiate a Class 3 or Class 2 Alert. In authorizing the Class 3 or Class 2 status, a formal order both would confirm the preparatory order and set in motion planning for a higher-stage alert. In a confirmed emergency, the CMC, now operating as the national command authority, would be able to bypass the preparatory order and directly tell the General StaffÕs Operations Department to issue the formal order that initiates a Class 1 Alert.
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The sequence of alerts and orders would involve the following:
. Standing War Preparations Alert (jingchangxing zhanbei zhuangtai ). This routine or normal day-to-day readiness condition assumes that an enemy attack is possible but unlikely. To order any higher alert status, intelligence must indicate a heightened threat level. . Class 3 Operational Preparations Alert (sandeng zhanyi zhunbei zhuangtai ). Intelligence must indicate that an enemy attack is probable to justify the initiation of this alert status. Upon receipt of a preparatory order from the CMC via the command-and-control systems, the Second Artillery sends the order to the missile bases, which accelerate preparations for launching their missiles. The CMC then issues a formal order to confirm the mandated preparations in anticipation of going to a higher-stage alert. During the preparations, base security is rapidly upgraded. . Class 2 Operational Preparations Alert (erdeng zhanyi zhunbei zhuangtai ). To initiate this alert status, intelligence must confirm that an enemy attack is underway, but the CMC in consultation with the PolitburoÕs Standing Committee has not yet decided on its response. When a Class 2 Alert is sounded upon receipt of the encoded preparatory order, all bases shift to maximum readiness, and the air defense and ground units assigned to missile bases become fully activated.
All further actions await receipt of the formal order. . Class 1 Operational Preparations Alert (yideng zhanyi zhunbei zhuangtai ). A CMC-issued formal order to the Second Artillery headquarters will move specified launch bases to a Class 1 Alert. The precise nature of the threat level required to reach this decision remains highly classified, and the range of possibilities and response options could be quite complex. For example, the initial enemy attack could be a non-nuclear assault on ChinaÕs strategic targets such as the Second Artillery missile silos or command-and-control installations, and the PLA war plan would dictate the high commandÕs possible responses, including nuclear retaliation on the attackerÕs homeland. The formal order raises the combat-ready status of the designated bases and gives authority to their commanders to launch a nuclear counterattack upon receipt of a firing order from the CMC in accordance with the specific operational plan. In this alert status, the base and its launch battalions must be ready for firing missiles.
By the time a Class 1 Alert is issued, the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo would have made its decision for a nuclear response and transferred the national command authority to the military commission. 16 After the CMC finalizes the relevant operational and targeting plan with the committeeÕs general approval, the CMC promulgates the firing order via the General Staff Operations Department to the Second Artillery and selected launch units. The firing order also has a twolevel sequence: the preparatory order and formal order. The preparatory order includes the precise timing for the mobile units to enter pre-surveyed launch sites far from their storage caves and for units in hardened silos to perform pre-launch inspections. The designated missile units can launch only upon receipt of a formal order from the CMC. The content of any formal order is said to be the core secret within the nuclear war plan.
Because of its limited number of nuclear warheads and missiles, the Second Artillery has selected a list of priority targets of the major imagined enemies and ranked them for their perceived value. The criteria for making the target list range widely, from international security threats and a potential enemyÕs retaliatory capabilities to the availability of specific weapons for use against high-value targets. The assessment of each missile systemÕs attack profile (survivability, penetrability, precision, and destruction potential, for example) and the characteristics of each possible target are also considered.
Using those criteria, the CMC divides the targets of ChinaÕs probable enemies into five categories, based on: In formulating targeting policies, the Second Artillery has adopted the principle of cost-effectiveness, or use of the fewest weapons for maximum effect. It regularly reruns its scientific calculations and computer simulations to test and refine those policies and has written several tens of operational plans for the CMCÕs use in a crisis or war. These plans cover contingencies from warnings and alerts to escalation scenarios and full-scale nuclear war. Given ChinaÕs fundamental vulnerability in todayÕs nuclear environment, Beijing would activate any of these plans only as a last resort.
Yet, should the unthinkable nuclear conflict occur, the Second Artillery has calculated the exact sequence of steps leading up to launching its missiles under different conditions. Officers in its Operations Department have categorized and numbered hundreds of cards that list the key elements for each type of launch. The crises themselves are typed, and precise responses dictate which cards would be used. At the onset of a crisis, launch brigades are directed to select a predetermined Lewis and Xue 59 set of numbered cards that have been chosen to achieve the CMCÕs political and military aims. When so ordered, the launch commanders must follow the instructions on these cards and strictly pursue their mandated procedures in a Òtimely, precise, and secretÓ manner.
A typical launch order is simple and encrypted. It specifies the battalions to be alerted, the number or numbers of the targeting cards to be used, the time period to complete the order, the escape plan for the soldiers after launching its missiles, and other items. The numbering and contents of the targeting cards are top secret. They include the names of the targets with their geographical coordinates, the types and numbers of missiles and warheads to be used, the types and heights of the expected explosion, the launch sequence, and the intended effects of the ordered nuclear strikes.
The increased importance of the three ÒdoublesÓ concepts, with the complicating deployment of large numbers of conventional missiles, undoubtedly has forced the CMC and missile commanders to reconsider and modify some of the all-nuclear operational regulations and to test them in repeated combat exercises. 17 Yet, the profound differences between the nuclear and conventional battlefields and the highly fluid and diverse challenges of modern conventional warfare defy easy generalization or predetermined actions written down on little cards. Alerts and targeting in such complicated and unpredictable warfare will depend more on traditional military experience and combat lessons that have no parallel in the preparations for a nuclear conflict.
The contradictions of double command in a high-tech local war By the end of the 1990s, ChinaÕs Central Military Commission had changed the military strategic guideline to winning high-tech local wars and nuclear deterrence. Years later, the CMC stated that a local war under conditions of informatization Òis a confrontation between systems, and its basic form is the integrated joint operations.Ó Thereafter, the Chinese military began moving in the direction of enhancing its integrated joint combat capabilities and joint training. 18 Because the CMC attaches great importance to the dynamic relationship between the nuclear shield and the conventional sword, it considers conventional missiles to be one of the multiple means to consolidate the nationÕs strategic deterrent. The sequential and possibly combined employment of conventional and nuclear missile brigades is deemed a fundamental source of political and military strength. It is, however, also the troubling source of critical uncertainties. The basic dilemma for the war planners stems from the deployment of the two types of missiles on the same Second Artillery bases with fundamentally different capabilities and purposes. In the practice of double deterrence and double operations, the nuclear missilesÕ essential mission is to deter a nuclear first strike on China, and they are only to be used in extremis. At the same time, the conventional weapons on the formerly all-nuclear bases must be ready to strike first and hard.
This unique duality complicates three basic elements of ChinaÕs nuclear policy and strategy:
. A small, stable nuclear arsenal is housed with large and increasing quantities of mid-range conventional ballistic and cruise missiles. . No-first-use of nuclear weapons is stated policy, but conventional missiles can be fired first from bases that also contain nuclear missiles, using the same command-and-control infrastructure as would be used for a nuclear launch. . The CMC holds sole authority for the use of nuclear weapons, but the launch of conventional missiles is under the CMCÕs command authority and the coordinated operational control of the theater joint command.
Of the three doubles of Chinese nuclear strategy, double command is the most complex and unpredictable; it is also the concept about which we know the least. A missile baseÕs headquarters exercises command and control over both its nuclear and conventional missile brigades, but that double command is governed by the schizophrenic requirements just described.
Furthermore, the missile forces themselves do not have self-defensive capabilities, even though their mission statement is defined as self-defense. After all, missiles are essentially offensive in nature and must be fired to assure their survival. The missile forces always face this use-it-or-lose-it predicament when confronting a stronger and more aggressive rival. And the air-and missile-defense systems assigned to protect them would also risk destruction on combat missions predicated on the strategic guideline of active defense, even though China by definition and tradition cannot be the aggressor.
If the CMC authorizes a missile base to launch preemptive conventional attacks on an enemy, however, the enemy and its allies could not immediately distinguish whether the missiles fired were conventional or nuclear. From their perspective, the enemy forces could justifiably launch on warning and retaliate against all the command-and-control systems and missile assets of the Chinese missile launch base and even the overall commandand-control system of the central Second Artillery headquarters. In the worst case, a self-defensive first strike by Chinese conventional missiles could end in the retaliatory destruction of many Chinese nuclear missiles and their related command-and-control systems. That disastrous outcome would force the much smaller surviving and highly vulnerable Chinese nuclear missile units to fire their remaining missiles against the enemyÕs homeland. In this quite foreseeable action-reaction cycle, escalation to nuclear war could become accelerated and unavoidable. This means that the double policies could unexpectedly cause, rather than deter, a nuclear exchange.
Yet, the reasoning could go the other way, too, as appears to be the case today in Chinese military planning circles. Launching conventional weapons from nuclear bases might deter any direct response, because the victim of that attack would fear the consequences of retaliating against bases that have nuclear and not just conventional weapons. This fearÑthat a conventional response might trigger a Chinese nuclear counter-retaliationÑcould, in the eyes of Chinese experts, deter such a response, preventing escalation. BeijingÕs strategic theorists argue, moreover, that the coordination of systems that the Chinese war plan requires connects Second Artillery bases to the theater military commands, thereby constraining and challenging enemy tactics and targeting policies in a high-tech local war.
Thus, the dilemma for China and any potential enemy: Both sides, clinging to incongruous assessments, run the risk of provoking unanticipated escalation to nuclear war by seeking a quick victory or tactical advantages in a conventional conflict. This dilemma is not only real, but perilous.
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